The European Union’s lack of political strategy toward the Western Balkans can only benefit Russia and China

As several countries celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the big bang enlargement on May 1, there was little cause for jubilation in the Western Balkans.

A summit of the region’s leaders, hosted in Berlin by Chancellor Angela Merkel on April 29, exposed divisions and indecision instead of unity and strategy. The lack of any sustained, long-term policy toward the Western Balkans will play into the hands of Russia and China, as if EU leaders are not already aware of that possibility.

Indeed, it is more than worrying how European governments have consistently failed to take its own back yard—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo—seriously. It’s as if the EU has learned little from the former Yugoslav war of the 1990s that exposed deep historical divisions among the big EU countries.

The war finally ended in 1999. But it did not put closure to the centuries-old conflict between Serbia and Kosovo—a conflict that, to this day, divides the union. The EU has failed to adopt a united stance on recognizing the independence of Kosovo in 2008, with several countries, including Spain, opposing that new status. Serbia, which waged a policy of ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during the 1990s ending only after NATO intervened, has consistently rejected Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.

Yet because Serbia wants to join the EU—as does Kosovo—Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his Kosovar counterpart, Hashim Thaçi, proposed a land swap on ethnic lines last year in a bid to normalize relations. The calculation was that if such a swap could be agreed, Serbia could then recognize Kosovo’s independence, one of the major conditions for starting accession talks with the EU.

Those bilateral talks not only broke down, but any idea of a land swap was vehemently opposed by Merkel and former diplomats and ministers who played a major role in ending the war in the former Yugoslavia. They believe it would set a very dangerous precedent. But the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, and President Donald Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, supported the swap.

In the meantime, relations between Belgrade and Pristina have turned sour. In November 2018, Kosovo imposed a 100 percent tariff on Serbian goods because Belgrade has been lobbying against Kosovo joining Interpol, precisely because it would amount to this organization giving Kosovo’s independence more international legitimacy.

During the Berlin summit, Merkel, who has taken a close interest in the Western Balkans after she launched the “Berlin Process” in 2014, which was aimed at encouraging regional cooperation and closer integration, had hoped to kickstart a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Another summit will be held in July 2019, this time hosted in Paris by President Emmanuel Macron.

Macron’s attitude toward the Western Balkans is completely at odds with Merkel’s. Merkel is not naïve enough to believe that these countries will join the union in the near future. The state institutions are very weak, corruption is rampant, and the economies are underdeveloped. But she knows that down the road the region’s place is in the EU.

Macron, however, has little interest in mentioning the “e” word. Further enlargement, in his view, would further weaken the cohesion of the EU and fuel populist or far right movements. It is a view shared by some other countries, including the Netherlands.

Yet what is even more disappointing about these divisions and lack of strategy is the EU’s attitude toward North Macedonia. Against all the odds, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev managed to resolve a long and debilitating dispute over the future name of Macedonia. When the agreement was clinched between Athens and Skopje, it was an immense fillip for Zaev. Greece would no longer block Zaev’s ambitions to have his country join NATO and the EU.

Yet, for all the courageous steps in ending this dispute, the EU has been ungracious, to say the least. During the Berlin summit, Zaev was hoping he would be given a date for starting EU accession talks. Macron did not agree. Nothing like a slap in the face for Skopje and Athens.

The rest of the region still hopes that Merkel will change Macron’s mind. But for now, the EU’s policy toward the Western Balkans is divided and short-sighted.

Thankfully, these countries can still count on NATO to extend security and stability. In July 2018, it invited North Macedonia to join after previously admitting Montenegro, a move Russia had tried to prevent. Without the alliance, the region would be in a very sorry state and even more vulnerable to Russian interference.

By Judy Dempsey

Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe.

Few want the UK to crash out of the EU without a deal. After a tumultuous week for Theresa May, the chances have risen that Brexit won’t happen at all.

This week the chances have risen that the United Kingdom will abandon Brexit and remain in the European Union. This may seem an odd conclusion to draw when Theresa May backed out of a vote in Parliament on her plans to leave the EU—and 48 hours later saw more than one in three of Conservative MPs oppose her in a vote of no confidence in her leadership. But let us consider the key events of the days, weeks, and months ahead.

December 2018 European Council meeting

At this week’s EU summit in Brussels,  the prime minister will seek a legally watertight commitment to give the UK the right to withdraw the Irish backstop (the arrangement designed to ensure that the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic remains open, regardless of the progress of talks on the UK’s long-term trading relationship with the EU). She will fail. She may well secure a general “reassurance” that the Irish backstop will stay for as short a time as possible, but nothing that changes the legal basis of the deal she signed.

The vote in the UK Parliament on the withdrawal agreement

The UK Government is formally committed to a vote on the agreement by January 21, 2019. It could come as soon as next week. Almost all non-Conservative MPs will vote against it— including Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party, which entered into a deal to keep Mrs. May in office after last year’s general election, when the Conservatives lost their majority. In addition, more than 100 Conservative MPs (out of the party’s total of 317) have said publicly that they will vote against the agreement. If every MP keeps to the position they have announced, more than 400 MPs will vote against the deal, while no more than 220 MPs will support it. This would produce a crushing majority of 200 against the government.

We should not be surprised if the vote is in fact closer than that. But a defeat by, say, 80 or 100 would still be decisive. While a defeat by 10 or 20 would encourage Mrs. May to try again a week or two later, a significantly greater loss would kill her hopes of ever getting the withdrawal agreement through Parliament.

The Prime Minister’s response to MPs’ rejection of her plan

In one respect, Mrs. May has been strengthened by her less-than-overwhelming victory in this week’s no confidence vote. Under Conservative Party rules, another such vote cannot be held for twelve months. This fact increases her freedom of action when MPs reject the withdrawal agreement. She can seek a way forward that attracts MPs from a number of parties. If she succeeds, then she might be able to secure a majority in Parliament—even if the hardline, Conservative Brexiters oppose her new plan—safe in the knowledge that her position as prime minister is secure for the time being.

What would that new plan be? Few MPs want the UK to crash out of the EU without a deal. The government’s own projection suggests that a no-deal Brexit could cost almost 10 percent of GDP.

We also know that the EU will reject any revision to the current deal. The only way forward that is likely to satisfy both Brussels and Westminster is for the UK to align its economy more closely to the EU than the withdrawal agreement proposes.

One option is the “Norway Plus” plan. Norway is outside the EU and its Customs Union, but is a member of the Single Market. Norway Plus would broadly replicate this relationship but with the UK also remaining in the Customs Union, or something like it. The advantages are clear: frictionless trade with the EU would continue; Ireland’s border could remain completely open; British jobs, investment, and prosperity would suffer far less than any other form of Brexit. The disadvantages are equally clear: like Norway, the UK would have to make continuing payments to the EU; the UK would be subject to EU rules and regulations without having any say in them; the UK would have to maintain freedom of movement for EU citizens—anathema to those pro-Brexit MPs and voters who want the UK to have the right to control immigration.

The more those disadvantages have been discussed at Westminster, the more the prospect of Norway Plus has faded. Which leaves only one option standing: not leaving the EU at all. This prospect has risen sharply in recent days—not because there is (yet) majority enthusiasm for it at Westminster, but because it is dawning on growing numbers of MPs that this could end up as the least-bad route out of the present crisis.

Labour’s response

Although big majorities of Labour MPs, party members, and local Labour voters want the UK to remain in the EU, the party leadership has not yet embraced either this objective or the obvious way to achieve it—calling a fresh referendum. Instead, Labour is demanding a general election.

This will probably (though not certainly) fail. Most MPs, whatever their differences on Brexit, don’t want to risk an election that could make Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn prime minister. They won’t vote for an early election. Corbyn will then come under huge pressure from within his party to back a second referendum. The chances are that he will agree, albeit reluctantly. With support from MPs in other parties, including a significant minority of Conservatives, there will be enough MPs across Parliament to call a referendum.

The request for an extension of Article 50

Under the UK’s rules for holding referendums, it would take at least five months to arrange one. Depending on when Parliament takes the decision, it could not be held before July, or possibly September, next year. This means that the UK will need to remain in the EU beyond the scheduled departure date of March 29, 2019. This is likely to be agreed by the rest of the EU. But following this week’s ruling by the European Court of Justice, the UK could, if necessary, simply withdraw the letter it sent last year and stay in the EU, at least for the time being.

The referendum question

Deciding to hold a referendum is one thing; getting agreement on the precise question is another. The likeliest choice it would offer is Remain versus the withdrawal agreement. But some people will demand other options. Remain versus no deal is one; a three-way (or two-stage) referendum is another: in which Remain, the withdrawal agreement, or no deal start off as possible options for voters.

The referendum result

The signs are that Remain would win. A YouGov poll last week for the Sunday Times found that, of those who took sides, 62 percent backed Remain, while just 38 percent backed the withdrawal agreement. The 24-point Remain lead is easily the largest in any recent poll. Moreover, it fits a pattern of a steady decline in support in recent weeks for Brexit and the government’s handling of the issue.

It should be stressed that nothing is certain. But the prospects are rising that the UK will remain in the EU beyond March 29, 2019 and perhaps indefinitely. It’s not that there is (yet) enormous enthusiasm among MPs for a referendum. However, come the new year, it could well be the only rational option left to MPs.

Peter Kellner, Carnegie Europe, 13/12/2018

Populist and nationalist forces are preparing a major offensive to overturn European politics. The stakes could not be higher.

“The wind is back in Europe’s sails,” declared European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker last September. But even metaphorical weather is highly changeable. Now a cold wind is blowing in the face of the EU and is rapidly strengthening into a storm. Keeping Europe’s ship on course will require skillful navigation, but its crew is squabbling about the direction of travel.

Migration remains the biggest challenge. While the numbers of arrivals are down, the hysteria is up, as populist movements and a growing number of mainstream politicians are building their business model on anti-migration sentiments. Because of the now dominant “nation-first” attitude, EU members cannot agree on sharing the burden and are therefore attempting to shift it to neighboring countries. But ideas such as disembarkation platforms, where people rescued at sea would be parked in third countries, find little buy-in in North Africa and in the Balkans. Realistically, there is no silver bullet for “solving” migration. By harmonizing legislation, building stronger institutions, and creating a genuine partnership with countries of origin and transit, the EU could manage migration responsibly. However, these would require cool heads and a shared commitment to common solutions—both of which are in short supply at the moment.

Having a president in the White House who sees the EU as a foe to be bullied into submission is also fundamentally unsettling. The ceasefire on trade tariffs agreed between Donald Trump and Jean-Claude Juncker brings welcome relief, but will it survive the next twitter storm? A benevolent United States has been crucial for the success of European integration. A persistent rivalry with Washington might drive Brussels toward greater autonomy, but it could also lead to a further weakening of the EU’s cohesion. When it comes to trade, the EU has the instruments and the clout to fight back, but trade wars rarely have winners. Effective international coalition building and reaching out to sensible parts of the U.S. political elite might avoid the worst, but the risks to the EU’s post-crisis recovery are grave.

As Brexit negotiations are entering the decisive phase, a crisis on this front is almost inevitable. The big question is whether it will be confined to London, where Theresa May might lose parliamentary support for her preferred “soft Brexit” and in consequence her job, or whether it will also affect Brussels, where the solidarity of the remaining EU-27 could crumble as divergent economic interests assert themselves.  It is likely that a calamitous “no deal” Brexit in March 2019 can be avoided, but maybe only by extending the negotiations and thus by prolonging uncertainty.

Meanwhile, the Article 7 procedure regarding Poland’s infringements of the independence of the judiciary appears deadlocked, and the Hungarian government’s pressure on civil society continues. The European Commission is shifting its approach to taking the governments in Warsaw and Budapest to the European Court of Justice for violations of the rule of law. This might help, if the court is ready to assume a more proactive role than in the past, but the rise of nationalist and xenophobic forces in many European countries will almost certainly result in more challenges to the EU’s values.

All this turbulence will complicate the work on the Multiannual Financial Framework, through which the EU decides on the size of its budget during the 2021-2027 period and defines what it will be spent on. Aligning the EU’s spending programs to changing political priorities and accommodating the diverse interests of member states would be hugely challenging even under better circumstances. This time, the negotiations will be even more difficult, as the divisions among member states are deeper and the resources scarcer because the UK, an important net-payer, is leaving. But with the future functioning of the EU at stake, an eventual agreement is likely—though probably not, as the Commission would prefer, before European Parliament elections in May 2019.

These elections could also turn into a major political tempest. Traditionally, European Parliament elections have been compartmentalized into multiple parallel elections, each dominated by national politics. They have been second-order political events with ever weaker voter participation. This time, however, the stakes will be higher.

Anti-EU and anti-migration forces from Le Pen to Salvini are preparing a major offensive to overturn EU politics by breaking the traditional dominance of the pro-European grand coalition of the center-right and center-left. While the EU-phobes are unlikely to win a majority, a strong showing of these parties would still be a big political setback for the EU, and a fragmented parliament could greatly impede EU decisionmaking.

The appearance of a “nationalist international” will hopefully trigger a countermobilization of pro-European political forces. If this happens, there is a chance that the election campaign will for the first time prompt a genuine transnational discussion on the future course of the EU. Such a debate involves risks, as major parts of the public remain alienated from the EU, but it also could turn into a catalyst for positive change. Some storms are necessary to clear the air and provide a better view on what the future holds.*

by Stefan Lehne, Carnegie Europe

AgriFood next is here

AgriBusiness Forum (ABF) is held annually in Greece to integrating partnerships and advancing knowledge for the digitization and digital transformation of the Agri & Food value chain in Greece and beyond.

ABF is a network gathering for agribusiness leaders, VC investors, agtech innovators, farmers, producers and academia connecting the modules of sustainable bio-agriculture, cultivation-plant-nutrition protection, digital farming, bio-engineering, artificial intelligence, agriculture automation, livestock adaption, food safety, certification and agri-logistics.

ABF enhancing issues affecting the improvement of the level of cross-sectoral cooperation interconnecting research & development, technology, education, cultivation, processing, businesses while stimulating policies towards near-future agriculture & circular economy, being factors which determine the value-added production, supply-chain optimization, capacity building & ag-tech models transferability.

Innovation into the DNA of ABF

AgriBusiness Forum is consisted by 5 modules integrated into one event:

1. A Masterclass to providing a 2-day immersive training to selected food & agtech scaleups
2. The Scaleups Challenge, a pitching/competition event where best 3 scaleups will be panelists to the forum
3. A Corporate Scaleups Engagement Program, where scaleups meeting with food/agri leading businesses
4. The Forum, an 1½ day conference about enhancing issues for the digitization and digital transformation of the Agri & Food value chain and providing insights for the agri-sectoral policies in Greece and the EU
5. Field Visits, as component about expanding knowledge, analyze elements onsite and point-out market opportunities of a specific agricultural project.

ABF2018 at a glance

Agribusiness Forum 2018: The Future of Greek & European Agriculture in the Digital Era

Agenda topics

Common Agricultural Policy in Greece and the European Union

Financial Instruments for smart agribusiness in Greece

Smart Plant farming

Smart Livestock farming

Agri & Distribution Logistics Chain in Greece and beyond

Smart Greenhouses

Private-Public Partnerships

Field visit, Nigrita village geothermal zone

Stay tuned

Balkans & Black Sea Cooperation Forum
Friday June 1^st 2018

Press Release
Forum Declaration 
“Rail, Road, Rivers Connectivity to the EU via Balkan region”

The 2^nd edition of the Balkans & Black Sea Cooperation Forum was successfully held in the city of Athens, Greece, from 30^thMay to June 1^st 2018. The Forum focused on a policy and a business summit with a hot headline: “Rail, Road, Rivers Connectivity to the EU via Balkan region” taking into account the various initiatives -or perhaps strategies?- of world’s superpowers in this region.

The participants expressed willingness to actively promote the Balkan and Black Sea region as a pivotal transportation hub and crossroads by accelerating sustainable connectivity as a key driver to strengthen the economic development for the region and its collaborators without any discrimination and in line with the international human rights and gender equality standards.

The region is the inter-connector between Europe, Asia and Africa through its extensive rail, road, air and maritime transport network. Collective cooperation – key to the development and the modernization of this network – is of particular importance to this region that is widely affected by trade and tourism.

In this framework, the participants expressed their readiness to contribute to the formulation of a “Roadmap for inclusive transport system in the Balkans and Black Sea region” ensuring free movement of people, goods and knowledge in line with international standards. Challenges are found in: 1.) Policy, such as the need to improve the regulatory framework, harmonize the national legislation and to collectively promote the region towards stakeholders located outside the region. 2.) Research and development, such as digitalization of transport and the lack of adequate infrastructure. 3.) Capacity building, such as employment opportunities and investing in people and skills to eradicate digital exclusion, especially of groups vulnerable to exclusion.

In particular Forum’s partners welcomed the Forum Declaration 2018 stimulating further inter- and intraregional cooperation among all relevant stakeholders and to raise awareness and motivate social responsibility with the aim to contribute to: 1.) increasing awareness and communication with neighbouring regions regarding the need to develop; 2.) drafting a proposal upgrading existing transport infrastructure, deploying Belt and Road initiatives crossing this region and establishing alternativeroutes for interregional trade, and; 3.) creating favourable conditions for attracting foreign and national investments, and identifying additional funding mechanisms targeting the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

Forum Partners and participants endorse sharing the Forum Declaration 2018 with more than 30 influential organizations and stakeholders responsible for policy shaping and business making in and for this region. As such,  they aim to contribute to the establishment of an optimal framework for the facilitation of an efficient and inclusive transport system meeting the economic, social and environmental needs of the Balkans and Black Sea region. BBSF will expect their reaction with the aim to create a dedicated community working towards the elaboration of the Roadmap.

Giannis Balakakis

Chair Organizing Committee

Balkans & Black Sea Cooperation Forum
www.balkansblackseaforum.org

• Download press release in pdf format here

• Forum Declaration 2018, “Rail, Road, Rivers Connectivity to the EU via Balkan region” Read and download here

• Press Release Forum Declaration “Rail, Road, Rivers Connectivity to the EU via Balkan region” Read and download here